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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Frederick Jacobsen entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of
methamphetamine preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Mr. Jacobsen asserts that the district court erred because his detention was unlawfully extended
to allow sufficient time for a drug detection dog, "Honcho," to arrive and sniff his vehicle.
Officer Mikowski delayed the completion of the traffic citation when he stopped writing the
citation to speak to the canine officer, when he individually moved both occupants and had them
sit on the curb, and again when he conversed with the passenger after he had completed all of the
tasks necessary to the traffic stop. Because officers unlawfully extended the duration of the
traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion of a drug offense, in violation of Mr. Jacobsen's
constitutional rights, Mr. Jacobsen respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district
court's order denying his motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 1, 2018, at approximately eight thirty in the morning, a vehicle driven by
Frederick Jacobsen was stopped by law enforcement for an equipment violation.

(9/27 /18

Tr., p.42, L.18 - p.44, L.24.) Specifically, the officer saw that the rear license plate was not
properly mounted on the rear bumper of the truck, and he could not see the registration tab.
(9/27/18 Tr., p.44, Ls.18-24.) Officer Mikowski spoke to Mr. Jacobsen, who did not have a
driver's license or insurance, and was unable to show ownership of the vehicle.

(9/27/18

Tr., p.45, L.21 - p.46, L.6.) Eight to nine minutes into the stop, the officer learned from the
passenger, Chris Roest, that Mr. Roest had been arrested the night before for possessing drug
paraphernalia and, based on this information, Officer Mikowski called a drug detection dog to

1

the scene. 1 (9/27/18 Tr., p.48, L.18-p.49, L.16; Exh. 1, 7:17-7:59.) Seventeen minutes into the
stop, Officer Mikowski called his supervisor and asked the statutory code section for an invalid
driver's license. (9/27/18 Tr., p.52, Ls.17-24; State's Exh. 1, 17:08-17:33.)
The dog, Hondo, and his handler arrived approximately ten minutes after Officer
Mikowski called for them. 2 (9/27/18 Tr., p.16, L.3 - p.18, L.7; p.48, L.18 - p.49, L.7; p.59,
Ls.20-24; State's Exh. 1, 19:15.) When the dog arrived at nineteen minutes and fifteen seconds
into the stop, Officer Mikowski muted his audio recording capabilities and stopped writing the
ticket to speak with Deputy Kindelberger about the occupants and why he requested a dog.
(9/27/18 Tr., p.54, L.17 -p.56, L.3; State's Exh. 1, 19:15.) He spoke to Deputy Kindelberger for
at least 17 to 18 seconds before he resumed his work on the computer. (9/27/18 Tr., p.55, Ls.17
-p.56, L.3; State's Exh. 1, 19:15-19:38.) Officer Mikowski testified that, at the time he spoke to
Deputy Kindelberger, he had all of the information he needed from dispatch in order to complete
the citation. (9/27 /18 Tr., p.56, Ls.4-13.) Instead of immediately explaining the citation to the
driver, he individually spoke to each of the two occupants and walked each of them over and
directed them to sit on the curb. (9/27/18 Tr., p.57, L.15 - p.58, L.20; State's Exh. 1, 22:4023:36.) While standing around waiting for the drug dog to sniff the car, Officer Mikowski
chatted with the passenger about the passenger's crazy night and the injuries to his face.
(9/27/18 Tr., p.59, L.7 -p.60, L.3; State's Exh. 1, 23:36-27:51.)

1

Although his check through dispatch did not tum up any warrants, Officer Mikowski
nevertheless asked the occupants if they were on probation or parole. (9/27/18 Tr., p.79, L.21 p.80, L.24; Exhibit 1, 7: 17-7:50.)
2
Although Officer Mikowski had audio capabilities, he paused recording once Deputy
Kindle berger arrived, thus recording no portion of the interaction between himself and the other
officers at the scene, or with Mr. Jacobsen or his passenger until after the dog alerted. (State's
Exh. 1, 9:15-25:20.) Deputy Kindelberger's body camera audio was continuously running, but
in that recording it is not always clear what Officer Mikowski was doing. (See State's Exh. 2.)

2

When the dog was run around the exterior of the vehicle, it alerted. (9/27 /18 Tr., p.62,
Ls.13-15.) Officer Mikowski and Deputy Kindelberger found nothing in a subsequent search of
the interior of the vehicle.

(9/27/18 Tr., p.62, Ls.13-25.)

Officer Mikowski then turned to

Mr. Jacobsen and asked to search his pockets, "Is it cool if I check really quick?" (9/27 /18
Tr., p.63, L.22 - p.64, L.24.) Mr. Jacobsen consented, and a baggie containing a substance the
officer believed to be methamphetamine was located in Mr. Jacobsen's right front coin pocket.
(9/27/18 Tr., p.65, L.19 -p.66, L.3.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information which alleged that Mr. Jacobsen
committed the crime of possession of methamphetamine.

(R., pp.52-53.)

Thereafter,

Mr. Jacobsen filed a Motion to Suppress, a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress
Evidence, and two affidavits in support of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.97-119.) He asserted
that the evidence gathered against him should be suppressed for four reasons: First, the officers
did not have a reasonable belief that Mr. Jacobsen was armed and dangerous and thus were not
justified in searching or even asking to search him; second, the pat-down search exceeded the
scope of Mr. Jacobsen's consent; third, Mr. Jacobsen's consent to search was coerced; and
fourth, Officer Mikowski unlawfully prolonged the stop by beginning a drug investigation absent
reasonable articulable suspicion. (R., pp.103-19.) The State filed a memorandum in opposition
to Mr. Jacobsen's motion to suppress and a hearing was held on the motion. (R., pp.126-38;
Tr. 9/27/18.)
Both parties submitted post-hearing briefing, pursuant to the district court's request.
(R., pp.154-97.)
The district court made the following written factual findings:
1. On April 1, 2018, Officer Mikowski conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle in
Meridian, Idaho.

3

2. Officer Mikowski testified that he initiated the stop based on his observation
that the rear license plate was not properly mounted on the vehicle and a
portion of the plate was blocked by a decal.
3. Officer Mikowski made contact with the driver, Frederick Jacobsen and
explained the reason for the stop. Officer Mikowski requested Mr. Jacobsen's
insurance, driver's license, registration, and the passenger's identification,
also.
4. Mr. Jacobsen provided an identification card, as he did not have a driver's
license. Officer Mikowski then ran both the driver's and passenger's
information and checked whether either had any outstanding warrants.
5. After four and a half minutes inside his vehicle, Officer Mikowski returned to
Mr. Jacobsen's pickup truck and ask Mr. Jacobsen if he had located either the
registration or insurance for the truck. Mr. Jacobsen told the officer that he
did not have insurance because he had just bought the truck and that he did
have a bill of sale for the truck, from the passenger's, Christopher Roest's,
boss.
6. Officer Mikowski asked whether Mr. Jacobsen or his passenger was on
probation, parole, or out on bail. Mr. Jacobsen said no, but Mr. Roest said he
was out on bail for a revoked registration and license and possession of
paraphernalia.
7. While Officer Mikowski pursued this line of questioning, Officer
Kindelberger arrived with a drug detection canine. Officer Mikowski turned
off his audio recorder and had a conversation with Officer Kindelberger.
8. Officer Kindelberger directed Mr. Jacobsen out of the truck, patted him down
for weapons, and told him to sit in front of Officer Mikowski's police car.
During this time, Officer Kindelberger also asked Mr. Jacobsen whether there
were drugs in the truck.
9. Officer Kindelberger then had Mr. Roest exit the vehicle to search him for
weapons and ask him about his drug use. During the questioning of
Mr. Roest, Officer Mikowski finished printing the citations and stepped out of
his vehicle. He then approached Mr. Jacobsen and directed him to sit on a
curb by the police car.
10. While the audio is off, Officer Mikowski is seen speaking to Mr. Jacobson,
and then directing Mr. Roest to sit next to Mr. Jacobsen, on the curb.
11. While Officer Mikowski is speaking to the driver and passenger, Officer
Kindelberger retrieves his canine and conducts a sniff of the truck. During
most of this time, Officer Mikowski has his audio of£

4

12. When the audio of Officer Mikowski finally comes back on, it picks up his
casual conversation with the passenger, a conversation unrelated to the
citation.
13. Officer Kindelberger' s canine then alerts on the truck and Officer Mikowski
assists in a search of the interior of the truck.
14. A search of the truck reveals nothing. Officer Mikowski directs the stillsitting Mr. Jacobsen to stand up and speak to him away from the passenger.
Mr. Jacobsen then consents to a search of his person and Officer Mikowski
finds a small baggie containing a white substance that tests presumptively
positive for methamphetamine.
(R., pp.205-06.) 3 The district court concluded, "While it appears that Officer Mikowski does
engage with Mr. Roest in a conversation unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop with
Defendant, based on the video evidence the Court cannot find that Officer Mikowski
intentionally extended the stop past the time reasonably necessary to complete the traffic stop."
(R., p.210.) The district court ultimately denied Mr. Jacobsen's motion to suppress, fmding that
the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, Mr. Jacobsen knowingly and voluntarily
consented to a search of his pockets, and the length of the investigatory detention was not
unlawfully extended. (R., pp.205-11.)
Mr. Jacobsen entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress. (R., pp.234-45.) Later, the district court sentenced him to a unified term
of seven years, with two years fixed, but it retained jurisdiction over Mr. Jacobsen for up to 365
days. 4 (R., pp.255-58.) On March 20, 2019, Mr. Jacobsen filed a Notice of Appeal timely from

3

These findings have been presented as individually numbered fmdings herein for ease of
reading.
4
At the rider review hearing, the district court commuted Mr. Jacobson's sentence to credit for
time he had served and closed the case. (Aug., pp.1-4.)
5

the district court's Judgment and Commitment and Order of Retained Jurisdiction. (R., pp.25962, 272-76.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Jacobsen's motion to suppress?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Jacobsen's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
In denying Mr. Jacobsen's motion to suppress, the district court reached three legal

conclusions. First, the court found that Officer Mikowski had a reasonable articulable suspicion
to initiate a traffic stop.

(R., p.207.)

Second, the district court found that Mr. Jacobsen

knowingly and voluntarily consented to a search of his pockets. 5 (R., p .207.) Third, the district
court found that the duration of the stop was not illegally extended. (R., pp.209-10.)
Mr. Jacobsen asserts that, although his initial detention was lawful, the length of his
detention was impermissibly extended.

He asserts first that it was extended when Officer

Mikowski spoke to Deputy Kindelberger prior to the dog sniff

Further, the processes of

separately moving Mr. Jacobson and Mr. Roest and directing them to sit on the curb, also
unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop.

Finally, Officer Mikowski's casual

conversation with Mr. Roest while standing and waiting for the dog sniff to occur, also
unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop
The purpose of the delay was to allow time for a drug dog to sniff the exterior of his
vehicle, based upon Officer Mikowski' s hunch that there were drugs in the vehicle.
Mr. Jacobsen's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, protected by the Fourth

5

See State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A consent to search given during
an illegal detention is tainted by the illegality and is therefore ineffective.").
8

Amendment to the United States Constitution and

6

was violated. Therefore, the district court

erred in denying Mr. Jacobsen's motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appellate courts

apply a bifurcated standard of review: the Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact,
unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the trial court's application of
constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009).

C.

The Duration Of The Traffic Stop Was Unlawfully Extended
Mr. Jacobsen asserts that the duration of the traffic stop was unlawfully extended. The

delays in this case occurred when Officer Mikowski ceased writing the ticket so that he could
speak with the canine officer, when he separately moved Mr. Jacobsen and his passenger to the
curb prior to the dog sniff, and when he casually conversed with the passenger for several
minutes while waiting for the dog sniff.
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of the occupants that implicates the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Law enforcement may stop a person for a brief, investigatory detention if
the officer has an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person stopped is, or is
about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (citations
omitted). "The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law
enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect."

6

An argument was also made below under Article I§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution (R., pp.97-98);
however, Mr. Jacobsen will rely upon Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for purposes of his
appeal.
9

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary

and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id. "Similarly, the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to
verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Id. (citations omitted). "It is
the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable
suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an
investigative seizure." Id.
In Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) the United States Supreme Court
held "a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made
violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." Id. at 1612. In so finding, the
Rodriguez Court made clear that it was adhering to the line drawn in its prior decision in
Illinois v. Caballes. Id; see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that a lawful

seizure justified only by a traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete the purpose of issuing a ticket for the violation).
In analyzing the issue, the United States Supreme Court explained: "Like a Terry stop,[7]
the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's
'mission'-to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety
concerns." Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court reiterated that "[b ]ecause addressing the
infraction is the purpose of the stop, [the detention] may 'last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate th[ at] purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the infraction
are-or reasonably should have been-completed." Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court
recognized that an officer "may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful

7

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

10

stop. But ... he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop absent the reasonable suspicion
ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual." Id. (internal citations omitted).
In Rodriguez, "[t]he Government argue[d] that an officer may 'incremental[ly]' prolong a
stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the trafficrelated purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to
the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances." Rodriguez v. United States,
135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015). However, the Supreme Court rejected that argument:
The Government's argument, in effect, is that by completing all traffic-related
tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal
investigation. The reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the
police in fact do. . . . If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries
expeditiously, then that is the amount of "time reasonably required to complete
[the stop's] mission." As we said in Caballes and reiterate today, a traffic stop
"pro longed beyond" that point is "unlawful." The critical question then, is not
whether the dog sniff occurs before the officer issues a ticket, ... but whether
conducting the sniff "prolongs"-i.e., adds time to-"the stop .... "

Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, the district court identified the portions of the stop it saw as problematic prior to
hearing testimony at the suppression hearing. The court had reviewed the parties' motions and
the two officers' on-body video recordings.

(9/27 /18 Tr., p.5, Ls.18-25.) The district court

found, regarding the amount of time Officer Mikowski took to fold the tickets up, "And it feels a
little like that he's extending the stop at that point, but I can't assign that sort of malicious intent
to him based on that." (9/27/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-13.)

The court next analyzed why Officer

Mikowski had Mr. Jacobsen and Mr. Roest both sit on the curb. The court struggled with the
moving of the passenger, "And I don't understand what relationship that extension to move the
passenger has to [do with] explain[ing] the ticket to Mr. Jacobsen." (9/27/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-22.)
The court found the extension was "de minimus," but was concerned about why the officer had
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Mr. Jacobsen sit on the curb before explaining the ticket. (9/28/18 Tr., p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.21.)
The court's focus on whether the officer's intent in extending the stop was "malicious" and
whether the extension was "de minimus" is erroneous in light of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Rodriguez and the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Linze, 161
Idaho 605 (2016).

In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that de minimus

extensions are still Fourth Amendment violations, and in Linze, the Idaho Supreme Court held a
two-and-a-half-minute delay for assisting in the drug dog sweep violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.
After hearing the officers' testimony, the district court issued a written decision.
(R., pp.205-10.) In addition to making specific findings of fact, the district court concluded:
Given the complex nature of the stop: with Defendant's lack of a driver's license;
the convoluted ownership history of the vehicle; that the truck was registered in
the passenger's name; that Defendant had no insurance; that Mr. Ro est had a
suspended driver's license; the fact that neither Defendant nor Mr. Roest would
have been allowed to drive the truck away after the citation was given; and that
Officer Mikowski would have needed to explain both the citation process and the
options for Defendant and Mr. Roest regarding transportation following the
conclusion of the traffic stop, the Court cannot find that the time required to
reasonably address the purpose of the traffic stop would have expired prior [to]
the Officer Kindelberger' s canine alerting on Defendant's truck.
(R., p.210.) The district court concluded, that forty-three (43) second elapsed between the time
which Officer Mikowski delayed explaining the citation to Mr. Jacobsen in order to converse
with the passenger about his bail situation, and the dog's alert. (R., pp.209-10.) The court
concluded that it could not "find that the time required to reasonably address the purpose of the
traffic stop would have expired prior [to] Officer Kindelberger's canine alerting on Defendant's
truck." (R., p.210.) "While it appears that Officer Mikowski does engage with Mr. Roest in a
conversation unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop with Defendant," the court held it

12

"cannot find that Officer Mikowski intentionally extended the stop past the time reasonably
necessary to complete the traffic stop." (R., p.210.)
However, in Rodriguez the Court held, "The reasonableness of a seizure, however,

depends on what the police in fact do." Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616. After spending seventeen
minutes in his car checking for warrants and locating registration documentation, Officer
Mikowski called his supervisor to ask what code provision governed driving on an invalid
license. (9/27/18 Tr., p.49, L.11 - p.50, L.10; p.52, Ls.7-16.) It took the officer over 19 minutes
to run Mr. Jacobsen's and the passenger's information through dispatch and write one traffic
citation. (9/27/18 Tr., p.54, Ls.8-14.) And when the dog handler did arrive, Officer Mikowski
admitted that he stopped writing the ticket, turned his body-camera audio off, and spoke to the
officer. (9/27/18 Tr., p.54, L.17 - p.56, L.3; State's Exh. 1, 9:15-9:44.) When asked why he
removed the two occupants from the vehicle, Officer Mikowski said that it had to do with the
canine sniff, "Generally you don't let subjects just mingle around the car as another officer or
another canine officer is doing this thing around the car." (9/28/18 Tr., p.58, L.25 -p.59, L.6.)
Just as the officers cannot unjustifiably detain the defendant to allow the dog to arrive
and sniff the car, nor can the dog sniff itself illegally prolong the detention. As the United States
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, "[t]he critical question then, is not whether the dog sniff
occurs before the officer issues a ticket ... but whether conducting the sniff 'prolongs'-i.e.,
adds time to-'the stop[.]"' Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 407 (2005); see also State v. Linze, 145 Idaho 886, 890 (2008) ("The [Supreme Court's]
rule isn't concerned with when the officer deviates from the original purpose of the traffic stop, it
is concerned with the fact that the officer deviates from the original purpose of the stop at all.").

13

Here, the delay was threefold-not only did Officer Mikowski stop writing the ticket so
that he could speak with the canine officer, he also delayed the traffic stop when he separately
moved both men to the curb for officer safety prior the drug detection dog sniff, and when he
casually conversed with the passenger while waiting for the dog to complete a sniff of the
vehicle.
Mr. Jacobsen waited while Officer Mikowski stopped working on the citation to speak to
the dog officer. 8 (9/27/18 Tr., p.54, L.17 - p.56, L.13.) Mr. Jacobsen waited while both he and
the passenger were separately walked over and instructed to sit down on the curb. (9/27/18
Tr., p.15 - p.59, L.6.).

Mr. Jacobsen waited while Officer Mikowski conversed with the

passenger about how the passenger's interaction with officers on a different date and how he had
gotten marks on his face. (9/27/18 Tr., p.59, L.7-p.60, L.3; State's Exh. 1, 23:36-27:51.)
Officer Mikowski's delay in effectuating the traffic stop cannot be excused by concerns
for officer safety attendant to the traffic stop itself Officer Mikowski testified that, at the time
he spoke to Deputy Kindelberger, he had all of the information he needed from dispatch in order
to complete the citation. (9/27/18 Tr., p.56, Ls.4-13.) Instead of immediately explaining the
citation to the driver, he individually spoke to each of the two occupants and walked each of
them over and directed them to sit on the curb. (9/27/18 Tr., p.57, L.15 - p.58, L.20; State's
Exh. 1, 22:40-23:36.) Officer Mikowski testified that these actions had to do with the canine
sniff: "Generally you don't let subjects just mingle around the car as another officer or another
canine officer is doing this thing around the car." (9/28/18 Tr., p.58, L.25 -p.59, L.6.)

8

Officer Mikowski testified that his conversation with Deputy Kindelberger was an "officer
safety brief' so he "was not walking up to the unknown." (9/27/18 Tr., p.54, L.17 - p.56, L.3;
p.72, Ls.1-14; p.73, Ls.14-20.) Of course that conversation was only necessary to facilitate the
dog sniff.
14

The Rodriguez Court distinguished its holding in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977) (per curium), a case in which the Court held that ordering a driver to exit the vehicle was
justified for purposes of officer safety, from the situation in Rodriguez, where the on-scene
investigation into other crimes necessitated safety precautions to facilitate such detours. Id. at
1616. The Rodriguez Court rejected the "officer safety" excuse and concluded that a dog sniff
could not be justified on the same basis as the exit order in Mimms. Id.
After the hearing, the district court issued a written decision in which it found that fortythree (43) seconds elapsed between the time which Officer Mikowski delayed explaining the
citation to Mr. Jacobsen in order to converse with the passenger about his bail situation, and the
dog's alert. (R., pp.209-10.) During the hearing, the district court asked the officer why he
waited for two minutes before he explained to Mr. Jacobsen what was going to happen with the
citation. (9/27/18 Tr., p.93, Ls.1-11.) Because Officer Mikowski muted his audio, there is no
information as to whether he ever explained the citation to Mr. Jacobsen. (9/27/18 Tr., p.82, L. 7
- p.84, L.21.) The officer testified that he was going to explain the citation to Mr. Jacobsen but
instead talked to the passenger on the curb. (9/27/18 Tr., p.57, L.15 - p.60, L.8.) The officer
said he did not recall who he spoke to first, and the audio was muted; however, he did agree that
he intentionally brought Mr. Roest into the conversation. (9/27/18 Tr., p.93, Ls.7-25.) Officer
Mikowski ultimately admitted that there was no purpose served by bringing Mr. Roest into the
conversation, and that his act in bringing Mr. Roest over and inviting conversation effectively
delayed the stop. (9/27/18 Tr., p.93, L.19 - p.94, L.5.) The video shows Officer Mikowski
standing and talking to the passenger for several minutes, waiting for the dog sniff. (State's Exh.
1, 23:36-27:51.) The purpose of the stop should have been effectuated before the dog alerted.

15

In Mr. Jacobsen's case, the district court found that the length of the investigatory
detention was not unlawfully extended from the time of the initial stop to the time the drug dog
gave a positive alert on the vehicle. (R., p.210.) The district court concluded, "While it appears
that Officer Mikowski does engage with Mr. Roest in a conversation unrelated to the purpose of
the traffic stop with Defendant, based on the video evidence the Court cannot find that Officer
Mikowski intentionally extended the stop past the time reasonably necessary to complete the
traffic stop." (R., p.210) (emphasis added.) However, as noted, the applicable analysis is not
whether the officer intentionally extended the stop, but whether the officer did, in fact, extend the
duration of the stop. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. Even assuming, arguendo, that Officer
Mikowski did not intentionally delay in writing the citation in order to allow the dog sniff,
Officer Mikowski clearly did delay the completion of the traffic citation when he stopped writing
the citation to speak to the canine officer, when he walked each occupant over to sit on the curb,
and again when he conversed with the passenger after he had completed all of the tasks
necessary for the invalid driver's license ticket. Thus the district court's fmding that there was
no evidence that Officer Mikowski intentionally delayed the defendant or extended the duration
of the stop is irrelevant.
As noted, the district court also stated, "The Court cannot fmd that the time required to
reasonably address the purpose of the traffic stop would have expired prior [to] the Officer
Kindelberger's canine alerting on Defendant's truck." (R., p.210.) In so deciding, the district
court failed to recognize that Rodriguez clarified the applicable inquiry, "[t]he critical question is
not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether
conducting the sniff adds time to the stop." Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. In this case, the court
erred in fmding that the stop was not extended. See State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct.
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App. 2002) (holding that officer's continued detention to question the occupants of a car about
information unrelated to the purpose of the stop was unlawful even though the questioning only
extended the duration of the stop by sixty to ninety seconds).

D.

Conclusion: The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Jacobsen's Motion To Suppress
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Jacobsen asserts that his continued detention was

unreasonable and, thus, violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Mr. Jacobsen asserts that the discovery of the evidence used against him
was the product of his illegal detention and unlawful search and should have been suppressed as
"fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963).
Therefore, Mr. Jacobsen asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jacobsen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment and
reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 29 th day ofNovember, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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